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future harm.4 To effectuate such a policy Fischer would seem to
suggest that the above factors should be considered, and that if in
this light accountants may be seen to have breached the duty owed
to the public, then accountants should be liable to those injured under the remedial provisions of the common law and the federal securities statutes.
Fischerv. Kletz thus suggests a significant extension of accountants' liability under both the common law and the federal securities
regulations. Regarding the common law argument Fischer indicates that accountants could be held liable for negligent misrepresentations without the necessity of the plaintiffs' meeting a fictional
"gross negligence" standard as construed in Ultramares. In the area
of the federal statutes Fischer again moves forward by suggesting
that the plaintiffs could maintain a section 18(a) or rule 10b-5 action and continues the development of a body of law calling for
complete disclosure by those in a close relationship with a corporation to foster investor protection.
JOHN Z. SZABO

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - JUVENILE
COURT HEARINGS
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Important, inevitable, yet inadequate,' In re Gault2 inaugurates
the institution of constitutional due process requirements in juvenile
delinquency proceedings, thus heralding the rebirth of judicial fairness for juveniles while portending the imminent demise of the
present juvenile court system in the United States.
As critics have been swift to point out, many of the Warren
Court's major decisions3 have often involved fact situations so appallingly unfair to the individual as to lead to only one conscionable result, notwithstanding the many problems and constitutional
pitfalls encountered along the way. In re Gault is no exception.
In 1964, Gerry Gault was 15 years old, and, as Mr. Justice Fortas
implied in the majority opinion, he was a relatively normal, immature lad.' Trouble began for him when a neighbor told police the
41 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); see United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).

1968]

DUE PROCESS IN JUVENILE COURT

boy made "obscene" telephone calls to her, an offense punishable
in Arizona adult criminal prosecutions by not more than 60 days in
jail, a fine not over $50, or both.6 Criminal prosecution, however,
was not the law's tool for handling Gerry's case; rather, because of
his youth, the boy was given a juvenile court hearing7 where, theoretically, a "fatherly judge" might counsel him and determine his
"best interest."'
Young Gault's "best interest" was not decided to be paternal advice on the ill wisdom of childish prank telephone calls; nor was
the prescribed remedy the seeming other extreme of the adult penalty of 60 days in jail.' Instead, adjudging the 15-year-old a delinquent, the court in its discretion sentenced him to be confined
in the State Industrial School until his 21st birthday.1" The 6-year
1

The decision is inadequate in the sense that, since the Court restrained itself to
discussing a limited number of issues, many problems are left unsolved. See text accompanying notes 31-42 infra.
2387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
- 387 U.S. at 4-10.
5
The first amendment issue was ignored. The amendment provides, in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law.., abridging freedom of speech ...
OAM REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
7It would not have been different outside of Arizona. "From the juvenile court
statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico." 387 U.S. at 14.
8 Outlining the juvenile system's theory and history, Mr. Justice Fortas stated:
The early conception of the juvenile court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking
over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State provided guidance and help "to save him from a downward career." Id. at 25-26.
Further basic philosophy of the system is offered in a description by the authors of the
first juvenile court law:
[The State must step in and exercise guardianship over a child found under
such adverse social or individual conditions as develop crime .... [-H]e may
be treated not as a criminal... but as a ward of the state, to receive practically
the care, custody and discipline that are accorded the neglected and dependent
child .... Report of the Chicago Bar Committee, as quoted in 2 JUVENILE

CT. JUDGES J.10 (1960).
For a concise appraisal of the juvenile system's theory and its corresponding successes, see Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 801-10 (1966).
0
AMz.REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
10 387 U.S. at 29. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black observed some realities
of theoretical care in so-called State correctional institutions:
As a juvenile, however, he was put through a more or less secret, informal
hearing by the court, after which he was ordered, or more realistically "sentenced" to confinement in Arizona's Industrial School until he reaches 21
years of age. Thus, in a juvenile system designed to lighten or avoid punish-
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incarceration term was more than 35 times that possible were he but
3 years older. Moreover, a person of age 18 or more threatened
with such lengthy deprivation of liberty would have been insulated
against such governmental action by numerous constitutional procedural safeguards, including adequate notice of the charges," the
right to counsel,'" the privilege against self-incrimination," and the
right to confront witnesses. 4 Again, because he lacked the additional 3 years necessary for possible criminal status as an adult,
Gerry Gault got none of these.'" The complaining neighbor did
not even appear at the hearing.' 6
Equipped with this arsenal of facts, the Supreme Court, reversing Arizona's upholding of Gerry's commitment, 1 marked a major
milestone on the road to insuring fundamental judicial fairness for
children. The initial step foreshadowing the Gault breakthrough
had been paced off in Kent v. United States 8 where, after having
declined for years to consider various juvenile court constitutional
questions," the Court held that hearings to waive jurisdiction from
juvenile courts to adult courts "must measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment."2
In extending this rule to hold
ment for criminality, he was ordered by the State to six years' confinement in
what is in all but name a penetentiary or jail. Id. at 61 (concurring opinion).
Even if the State school could provide adequate care, the Court implied that young
Gault's home environment was not of the low quality which might warrant State intervention. Id. at 28.
11U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Central Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
14 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
15 "The essential difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that
safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's case. The summary procedure
as well as the long commitment were possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18." 387 U.S. at 29. The Arizona Supreme Court justified authorizing
juvenile courts "to disregard technical matters of procedure," on the ground that a "delinquent is the child of, rather than the enemy of society;" accordingly, the court affirmed an order dismissing the petition for Gault's release brought by his parents. 99
Ariz. 181, 188, 407 P.2d 760, 765 (1965), rev'd, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16 387 U.S. at 56.
17 Emphasizing that "the child's welfare is the primary consideration," the Arizona
Supreme Court stated that "we find that petitioners were not denied due process of law."
99 Ariz. at 193, 407 P.2d at 768-69.
18 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
19 See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The ConstitutionalContext of Juvenile Cases,
1966 SUPREME COURT Rnv. 167.
20 383 U.S. at 562.
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procedural safeguards applicable not only to waiver hearings but
also to the adjudicatory stage of all juvenile proceedings threatening governmental deprivation of liberty, Gault emphatically enunciated the principle that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.""' Where a juvenile in a delinquency hearing is subject to commitment to a State institution,
the due process clause of the 14th amendment now requires that
States provide the juvenile and his parents adequate written notice
of the charges,22 advise them of their right to counsel23 and privilege
against self-incrimination, 4 and afford them the right to confront
witnesses and cross-examine their sworn testimony. 5
Despite the sweeping revision in general court practice demanded by the opinion, Gault does not signify the immediate termination of the juvenile system.2" Left unquestioned for the
moment at least is the constitutional validity of a separate forum for
juveniles accused of delinquent behavior,2" as the Court is appar21387 U.S. at 13.
22Id. at 33.
23 Id. at 41. The Court's holding that the right to counsel adheres in all juvenile
proceedings which may result in institutional confinement would seem to make certain
the eventual extension of the right to counsel to adults in misdemeanor prosecutions as
well as in those involving a felony. Sensing this apparent disparity, Justice Stewart
said in dissent: "I find it strange that a Court so intent upon fastening an absolute right
to counsel upon nonadversary juvenile proceedings has not been willing even to consider whether the Constitution requires a lawyer's help in a criminal prosecution upon a
misdemeanor charge." Id. at 78 n.1. It must be pointed out, however, that juvenile
commitment is almost always for a minimum of 3 years because of the jurisdiction limitation to children under age 18. Justice Fortas noted, but did not emphasize, this fact
of minimum commitment so as to show that Gault does not give juveniles a greater
right to counsel than adults, considering that the adult right generally adheres where
commitment of 1 year or more may result Id. at 37 n.60; see Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24 387 U.S. at 55.
25Id. at 57. The Court declined to rule whether due process requires States to provide transcripts of juvenile hearings and an appellate review procedure, explaining that
reversal had already been reached for other reasons and that States have not yet been
held constitutionally required "to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review
at all." Id. at 58, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). The view that "the
Court has gone too far in some respects, and fallen short in others," was expressed in
the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan who stated, "the court must maintain a written
record ... adequate to permit effective review on appeal or in collateral proceedings."
387 U.S. at 72.
26lor a discussion of some initial changes in practice required by the decision, see
JUVENME COURT DIGEST, June, 1967.
2
7 The problem considered by the Court was restricted to determining the impact of
the due process requirement upon the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceedings.
Suggested, however, was an omen of possible extinction of the juvenile system: "The
constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is - to say the least - debatable." 387 U.S. at 17. The Court also hinted that a thorough discussion of the problem may be forthcoming: "We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these con-

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19: 394

ently willing to allot America's juvenile justice system a last chance
to help cure its own ills. The Court set down the rule demanding
factfinding fairness as the minimum necessary to take the child out
of the world where he gets the worst of both systems,2" and to place
him in a judicial atmosphere where he may still receive any special
benefits contained in the juvenile system yet not be denied the adult
system's procedural safeguards.2 9
No inconsistency with the basic philosophy of the separate system for juveniles emanates from application of constitutional protections to juvenile proceedings. On the contrary, implementation
of due process concepts will help readjust the once-clear focus on
the original view that a child needs greater safeguards than an adult
when governmental deprivation of liberty is threatened. Prior to
the creation of the separate system children were tried in the same
forum as adults and were accorded equal protection against the
State. In forming juvenile courts to save youthful offenders from
the austerity and harshness of the adult criminal system, "the legislative intent was to enlarge, not to diminish, these protections.""0
"Individualized justice,"'" the platitudinous hallmark of juvenile
treatment theory, will not be eliminated by the Gault decision,
which applies to only the factfinding hearing, but leaves unchanged
procedures allowable in preadjudication treatment 2 of juveniles and
postadjudication disposition." Therefore, as long as the fact of destitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state."
Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 18 n.23; see Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 387 (1961); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7.
29 Acknowledging that there are "aspects of the juvenile system relating to offenders
which are valuable," the Court stated: "But the features of the juvenile system which its
proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional
domestication." 387 U.S. at 22. It is generally true, however, that reputed values such
as avoidance of "criminal" classification, confidentiality of police records, and guidance
from kindly judges, have limited beneficial effect and may well be pretension rather
than fact. See Note, supra note 8.
30 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.D.C. 1955).
31 "The aim of the court is to provide individualized justice for children." 99 Ariz.
at 188, 407 P.2d at 765; see Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48
A.B.A.J. 719 (1962).
32 The juvenile system is therefore not required at this time to adhere to guidelines
set down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Among the questions unanswered is whether a juvenile is competent to waive effectively his right to counsel. See
In re Butterfield, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1967), where a California appellate court
held a juvenile's formal and literal waiver of counsel ineffectual as not made with an
intelligent understanding of its consequences. But cf. People v. Lara, 36 U.S.L.W. 2220
(Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 1967).
33 As stated by the Court, "nor do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary
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linquency is found in accordance with prescribed standards, Gault
does not dictate how well a State must treat a child before or after
the hearing itself. The theoretical fatherly judge is not precluded
from dismissing procedural principle and dispensing his own brand
of individualized justice.
Failure of the Court to set down procedural guidelines for the
postadjudicatory stage of the juvenile process is undoubtedly looked
upon as a major shortcoming in the eyes of those who view unregulated sentencing as the most menacing cloud over the juvenile justice landscape.3" As the Court itself made abundantly dear, a juvenile judge's power is too often reflected in "unbridled discretion"
which results in "unfortunate prescriptions of remedy." 5 Such discretion, "however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."3 Moreover, greater harm than
good may be caused by sentencing at an allegedly friendly, informal
hearing.37 Noting that "informality has no necessary connection
with therapy,"3 the Court further pointed out studies observing adverse effects on children when a proceeding's laxness is followed by
sharply contrasting stern institutional discipline. "
Though recognizing the fatherly judge figure as more rhetoric
than reality and the friendly, informal hearing as more hostile than
hospitable, the Court did not feel Gault the proper case to take requisite measures to abolish the Star Chamber aspects of child sendue process requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine the
disposition of the delinquent child." 387 U.S. at 27.
34
Unregulated juvenile sentencing is an invitation to exercise judicial whim and
caprice, according to the National Crime Commission:
And in all cases children need advocates to speak for them and guard their
interests, particularly when disposition decisions are made. It is the disposition stage at which the opportunity arises to offer individualized treatment
plans and in which the danger inheres that the court's coercive power will be
applied without adequate knowledge of the circumstances. PRESIDENT's
COMMIssIoN ON LAW ENFORCE3MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 86 (1967).

For an earlier dissimilar view, see Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized
Without Impairing Individual Rights?, 12 J. CRIm. L. & C. 339 (1921).
35 "Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in
instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate
or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy." 387 U.S. at
19-20.
36Id. at 18.
37In 1921 it was recognized: 'Trhe undisciplined minds of the juveniles and most
of the parents who come before the court cannot make dear distinctions between proceedings that are really friendly and paternal and those that are hostile, when the results may be alike in depriving them of liberty." Waite, supra note 34, at 345.
38 387 U.S. at 39 n.65.
89 Id. at 26.
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tencing4 ° and insure sorely needed fundamental fairness at the
disposition stage of the juvenile process.41 Therefore, since due
process is not yet required in sentencing, it is possible that the next
Gerry Gault, though provided with all safeguards now demanded
by the Court, may still be found delinquent and arbitrarily sentenced to 6 years in a State institution.4 2
As a converse to the view that Gault left too many problems
unsolved and stopped too short, it is conceivable that the Court created problems and went too far by insisting upon any constitutional
procedure whatsoever in the juvenile system. For despite the current system's myriad of shortcomings and the apparent necessity of
Gault to herald the coming of correction, it does not necessarily
follow that inquisition, discretion, and individualized justice must
be placed on a theoretical plane substantially lower than adversity,
rigid procedure, and structured sentencing. The problem with a
system based on the former concepts is that it has failed - not that
it must fail.4" The day may come when public clamor for a suc40 "In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: 'The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in
comparison with those of our juvenile courts. ... .'" Id. at 18. In 1967, even after
Gault, a Cuyahoga County, Ohio, juvenile case was suggestive of Star Chamber arbitrariness and unfairness. A 14-year-old British citizen, expelled from a public junior
high school for noncompliance with the school principal's concept of proper student
hair length, was sentenced to the juvenile detention home on the ground of "truancy."
The boy's father, who also wore his hair long, vehemently denounced the juvenile court's
mistreatment of his son, claiming: (1) the judge was wholly without constitutional justification in jailing the boy; (2) the judge summarily rejected a request to allow the boy
to be privately tutored rather than incarcerated; (3) in disregard for the confidentiality
of juvenile court proceedings, the judge had actually invited reporters and cameramen,
thus engendering a massive wave of publicity; (4) though inviting the news media, the
judge failed to inform the British Consulate of the hearing;, (5) the boy was given an
insufficient standard form warning of Gault-prescribed constitutional rights; and (6)
despite the publicity, no transcript of proceedings was made, thus perhaps precluding
effective appellate review. Interview with Ernest Towner, father of Carl Towner, in
Cleveland, Ohio, Oct. 25, 1967.
41
Not only was this not the proper case to set disposition guidelines but it also was
improper to go so far as to reach the issues of self-incrimination, confrontation and
cross-examination, according to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White. "This
case is a poor vehicle for resolving a difficult problem." 387 U.S. at 65.
42
A2z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (1956). Notwithstanding the Court's approval
of wide discretion to determine punishment in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949), it is difficult to justify fully a juvenile judge's vast dispositionary power. The
Williams decision referred to discretion "in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law." 337 U.S. at 246. When the punishment limit fixed by law is 60 days in jail, as in Gault, it would surely be repugnant to
the Williams principle to impose a 6-year sentence on the ground that the offense's
name had been changed from "made obscene telephone call" to "is a delinquent." Even
minimal application of due process and equal protection concepts would seem to dictate
that juvenile courts be restricted to imposing on a child no greater penalty than an adult
might incur "within limits fixed by law" for the same offense.
43 An Ohio juvenile court judge has attributed lack of success to a paucity of finan-
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cessful juvenile court system, springing from the continually increasing concern over the juvenile delinquency crisis, coerces the
legislatures into providing the economic resources necessary for efficient facilities with qualified personnel. Should that day arrive,
its horizon might well be shining with sufficient legal and behavioral expertise to make implementation of true individualized justice
a practical possibility. But the chance looms virtually nil that the
informal juvenile justice system can ever be resurrected because of
the Gault Court's intense fastening of its rationale to the Constitution.44
In light of the grave necessity for correcting the juvenile system's abysmally inept response to the juvenile delinquency dilemma,
the prospect is unlikely that Gault will be considered a judicial millstone rather than a milestone. 5 It now appears clear that, absent
an astronomic increase in juvenile court quality generally, the Court
may extend Gault principles in future decisions to engulf all requirements of due process, thus permanently cementing the constitutional stone on the tomb of arbitrary juvenile justice.46 Perhaps the
first of these anticipated decisions will be In re Whittington' in
which the Court is expected to determine whether due process requires juvenile rights to bail, to speedy trial by jury, and to fact determination on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.48 Now that the
Court is firmly entrenched in the juvenile rights field, hopefully not
too long a time will pass before the proper case is found for an attack on the citadel of caprice known as the disposition stage of the
cial support from the public: "The problems of the juvenile court arise from the failure
of society to provide the necessary facilities and personnel with which to achieve the
aims of its social welfare philosophy rather than from any shortcomings in the court's
legal procedures." Whitlatch, The Juvenile Court - A Court of Law, 18 W. REs. L.

REv. 1239, 1249 (1967).
44

Mr. Justice Stewart lamented in dissent that by imposing constitutional restrictions the Court's opinion "serves to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal prosecution." 387 U.S. at 79. Likewise, Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion implied a
strong fear of an inescapable entanglement of the juvenile system and formal adversity.
Id. at 65-78.
45 Dramatizing the impact of due process denial, the Court noted that one of every
five persons arrested for serious crimes in 1965 was under the age of 18. In that year,
601,000 children came before juvenile courts. Id. at 20 n.26.
46
See note 27 supra.
47 (Unreported, Fairfield Co. Ohio C. App.), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3143 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 1967).
48
However, the trend toward raising child offenders to a procedural rights level
equal with adult criminals has not been reflected in two post-Gault lower court decisions.
See In re Wylie, 36 U.S.L.W. 2040 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 1967) (proof beyond reasonable
doubt unnecessary); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 2187-88 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Oct. 3, 1967) (no juvenile right to trial by jury).
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juvenile process. A thorough elucidation of procedural guidelines
for the preadjudicatory and postadjudicatory treatment of youthful
offenders is rendered mandatory as a logical successor to the Gault
decision.
Gault saps at least some strength from the power of arbitrary
juvenile judges and makes it less likely that juveniles like Gerry
Gault will be capriciously denied their freedom. Their chance of
being treated as fairly as juvenile court founders envisioned is increased greatly as procedure supplants discretion in the juvenile system. Accordingly, Gault does not pull the juvenile justice process
backward4 9 but serves to propel it forward to approach America's
adult criminal justice system - a system of procedure immensely
improved during the 75 years in which the juvenile discretionary
system has failed.
ROBERT M. SHEAHEN
49 However, Mr. Justice Stewart dissented that imposition of "the Cour's long catalog of requirements upon juvenile proceedings in every area of the country is to invite a
long step backwards into the nineteenth century." 387 U.S. at 79. Objection can be
made to the dissent's implication that the adult system is still adhering to 19th-century
criminal processes. Unquestionably, the behavioral scientists would suggest a possible
inaccuracy in the conception that the object of the adult system is punishment while
the juvenile system's object is treatment. Twentieth century advances have generally
caused an agreement that deterrence and rehabilitation is the two-pronged goal of both
adult and juvenile systems. With the progress made in other areas, it is probably not
wholly defensible to give sole applause to the juvenile system for "bringing us out of the
dark world of Charles Dickens .... " Id. Without the existence of the separate forum
the Oliver Twists might have suffered more injustice in the days before the adult system
grew up; but the separate forum today can cause the Gerry Gaults injustice resembling
the 19th-century system, whereas a single forum might insure fairness at every stage of
the proceeding.

